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I. OVERVIEW
Prior to the United States Supreme Court Decision in United States v.
Bestfoods' on June 8, 1998, there had been a decade of confusion and
anxiety over parent corporation liability2 under the Comprehensive3
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA").
The ruling in Bestfoods makes it much more likely that future decisions will
be uniform, balanced, and precise with regard to parent corporation liability
for its subsidiary's illegal discharges.4 The resolution of corporate parent
1. 118 S. Ct. 1876 (1998) (Souter, J., unanimous decision).
2. Stephen L. Kass & Jean M. McCarroll, Environmental Law: Corporate Parent
Liability underCERCLA, 219 N.Y. L.J. 3, 3 (1998).
3. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980,
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994 & Supp. 1996).
4. Kass, supra note 2, at 3.
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liability under CERCLA is important because there are a large number of
hazardous waste disposal sites covered by CERCLA which are owned and
operated by poorly capitalized subsidiary corporations that have well
capitalized parent corporations. 5 Defining the standard by which a parent
may be held liable, due to the parent's good capitalization, will allow the
government to replenish the Superfund under which CERCLA operates.
Thus, facilitating increased cleanup activities at hazardous sites. 6
The intent of this note/comment is threefold. First, this note/comment
provides an opportune tangent into the intricacies of CERCLA as it applies
to the modem industrial polluter and parent corporation liability. Second, a
detailed description of the BesOfoods case and its history will put a very
obscure principle, which is fundamental to the resolution of environmental
woes7 in a clean and understandable context. By looking into the arguments
of both sides of the case it will become clear why and how the United States
Supreme Court reached its decision and what issues were left unresolved.
The preceding history of the case will demonstrate the lack of uniformity
between courts in considering the issue of parent corporation liability under
CERCLA. In conclusion, this note/comment will enumerate the political,
social, environmental, legal, and economic ramifications of the Court's
ruling in Bestfoods.
I.

INTRODUCTION

There is no area of law more fundamental to our human existence than
environmental law. However, environmental issues are often overlooked
because they threaten the capitalist's primary goals of attaining wealth and
economic growth.' After three hundred years of exploiting the once fertile
United States and several years of depleting its energy still further by
dumping synthetic chemicals, there are apples that taste like tennis balls,
oranges that taste like cardboard, and pears that taste like sweetened
Styrofoam.9 But alas, where certain evils could be abolished with a "stroke
of the pen, chemical pollution [can] not."1' The United States has hundreds

5. See Note, Liability of Parent Corporationsfor Hazardous Waste Cleanup and
Damages, 99 HARV. L. REV. 986, 987 (1986) [hereinafter HarvardLiability].
6. See Ronald G. Aronovsky & Lynn D. Fuller, Liability of Parent Corporationsfor
HazardousSubstance Releases under CERCLA, 24 U.S.F. L. REV. 421,423 (1990).
7. See id.
8. See Vice President Al Gore, Introduction to RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING xv,
xv-xxvi (Houghton Mifflin Company 1994) (1962).
9. BENJAMIN HOFF, TiE TAO OF POOH 101 (Penguin Books 1982).
10. GORE, supra note 8, at xix.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol23/iss3/7

2

Guzzano: United States v. Bestfoods: Decree on Parent Corporation Liabilit

1999]

Guzzano

of hazardous waste disposal sites and an estimated 10,000 sites which will
eventually be considered Superfund sites. 1
With haste,12 Congress passed CERCLA in 1980 after many highly
publicized abandoned hazardous waste disposal sites were found throughout
the United States. 3 Many of these sites had already damaged the
environment and human health "through the contamination of drinking water
supplies" and protein digestion in livestock.14 The main objective of
CERCLA is to clean up the nation's hazardous waste sites 15 by imposing
liability broadly on all parties who may have been potentially responsible for
the disposal of the waste.' 6 CERCLA allows The Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA") to bring actions to recover damages for past and future
cleanup costs. 17 These cleanup costs can run into "the tens of millions of
dollars for each site.'
CERCLA is essentially a strict liability statute requiring only: a release
of hazardous substances, at a facility, which causes injuries to the plaintiff'
and a defendant who is a responsible party as defined by the Act.20 There is
no need for culpability to be held liable under CERCLA.2 ' However, the
statute is "not [a] model of legislative draftsmanship," 22 as it provides no
direct means of imp osing parent corporation liability for the illegal acts of
their subsidiaries.
Nevertheless, nothing in CERCLA precludes parent
Allowing parent corporations 25 "to escape CERCLA
liability either.2
liability undermines the [entire] purpose of the Act 26 because the parent
11. Aronovsky, supra note 6, at 421-24.
12. HarvardLiability,supra note 5, at 987.
13. Aronovsky, supra note 6, at 425.

14. Id.
15. Id. at 422.
16. HarvardLiability,supra note 5, at 986.

17. See United States v. Cordova Chem. Co. of Mich., 750 F. Supp. 832, 834 (W.D.
Mich. 1990), rev'd sub nom United States v. Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. 1876 (1998).
18. Joel Glass, Test Shows when Firms Must Pay Price,LLoYD's LIsT INT'L, June 17,

1998, at 9.
19. The plaintiff may be a normal citizen or a state or federal appointed enforcement
bureau. 42 U.S.C. § 9659 (1994).

20. Id.
21. See CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Aerojet-Gen. Corp., 759 F. Supp. 1269, 1276 (W.D. Mich.

1991).
22. Brief for Respondent Bestfoods at 2, United States v. Bestfoods, 118 S.Ct. 1876

(1998) (No. 97-454).
23. Aronovsky, supra note 6, at 422.

24. Id. at 437.
25. Parent corporations are so called because of their control through ownership of the
corporate stock of their subsidiary. United States v. Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. 1876, 1884 (1998).
26. HarvardLiability,supra note 5, at 987.

Published by NSUWorks, 1999

3

Nova Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 3 [1999], Art. 7

Nova Law Review

[Vol. 23:927

corporations usually have the deeper pockets and can more adequately
reimburse the aggrieved party under the Act.27 The difficulty in identifying
the responsible parties under the Act2 has been enunciated in the varying
decisions across the United States regarding parent liability under
CERCLA.9
Since CERCLA's enactment, many courts have built an increasingly
"confused web" of statutory interpretation regarding parent liability. 0
Before the Besifoods ruling, the First, Second, Third, Sixth, and Eleventh
Circuit Courts of Appeals all differed on what standard to apply in order to
find parent corporation liability.3 1 Indeed, the case law relied upon in
Bestfoods reflects the widely divergent view that courts take in regard to
parent corporation liability; some require a piercing of the corporate veil,
while others require only a small degree of control by the parent over the
subsidiary.32 In addition, there is widespread conflict between jurisdictions
whether to apply state corporate law or to develop a federal corporation law

27. See id.
28. Aronovsky, supra note 6, at 425.
29. Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. at 1884 n.8 (1998) (citing an exhaustive number of cases
which illustrate the divergent views that different circuits hold in relation to parent
corporation liability under CERCLA).
30. Amicus Brief of United States Business and Industrial Council in Support of
Respondents at 2, United States v. Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. 1876 (1998) (No. 97-454).
31. See Respondent Michigan Department of Environmental Quality's Brief in Support
of Petitioner at 14, United States v. Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. 1876 (1998) (No. 97-454) (citing
Schiavone v. Pearce, 79 F.3d 248, 253 (2d Cir. 1996); Lansford-Coaldale Joint Water Auth. v.
Tonolli Corp., 4 F.3d 1209, 1220 (3d Cir. 1993); Jacksonville Elec. Auth. v. Bemuth Corp.,
996 F.2d 1107, 1110 (11th Cir. 1993); John S. Boyd Co., Inc. v. Boston Gas Co., 992 F.2d
401 (1st Cir. 1993); United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 910 F.2d 24, 27 (1st Cir. 1990); but
see Joslyn Mfg. Co. v. T.L. James & Co., 893 F.2d 80, 82-83 (5th Cir. 1990)).
32. Compare Martignetti v. Hairg-Farr, Inc., 680 N.E.2d 1131, 1138 (Mass. 1997)
(using an actual control test to find parent liability), with Trinity Indus., Inc. v. Dixie Carriers,
No. 90-2349, 1992 WL 161123, at *3 (E.D. La. June 24, 1992) (requiring that plaintiff
establish circumstances that require court to pierce the corporate veil), and Joslyn Mfg. Co. v.
T.L. James & Co., 893 F2d 80, 82-83 (5th Cir. 1990) (requiring corporate veil to be pierced,
but billing it as direct CERCLA liability), with United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 910 F.2d
24, 27 (1st Cir. 1990) (requiring only that parent control the "operations" of the subsidiary
itself), with Schiavone v. Pearce, 79 F.3d 248, 253 (2d Cir. 1996) (extends liability to all those
involved in creating harmful environmental conditions), with Lansford-Coaldale Joint Water
Auth. v. Tonolli Corp., 4 F.3d 1209, 1220 (3d Cir. 1993) (parent is only liable where
corporate veil can be pierced), with Jacksonville Elec. Auth. v. Bemuth Corp., 996 F.2d 1107,
1110 (11th Cir. 1993) (finds liability when parent exercises actual and pervasive control in
daily operations of subsidiary), with Bumet v. Clark, 287 U.S. 410, 415 (1932) (holding a
corporation and stockholders to be separate entities).

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol23/iss3/7

4

Guzzano: United States v. Bestfoods: Decree on Parent Corporation Liabilit

1999]

Guzzano

framework for use in interpreting CERCLA liability.33 While the Bestfoods
34
decision resolved many of these conflicts, other conflicts still persist.
The Bestfoods case has been closely monitored by environmental,
maritime, insurance, legal, and aviation groups.35 In Bestfoods, Justice
Souter held that a parent corporation could be held liable for the illegal
discharges made by its subsidiary in either of two ways.36 First, a parent can
be held liable under CERCLA for acts of its subsidiary through direct
operator status. 3 7 Thus, if the parent controls the subsidiary's polluting
facility, it will be held liable, but a parent is not liable when it controls only
the operations of the subsidiary's business. 38 The parent is essentially liable
for its own acts as operator of a subsidiary owned facility.39 The second wao
in which a parent can be held liable is indirect or derivative liability.
Indirect liability occurs through a process called piercing the corporate veil.
If and only if the corporate veil can be pierced may a parent be charged with
The Bestfoods decision
derivative or indirect liability under CERCLA.
also addresses specific factors that can be applied in evidencing either a
piercing of the corporate veil or direct operator liability. 42 It is critical to
understand that there is a significant difference between liability through the
corporate veil and liability through direct operator status under CERCLA.43
This definitive ruling settled a long standing area of confusion and may lead
to uniformity in court decisions, but there may be derogatory consequences
in light of the rules promulgated in Bestfoods.

33. Compare Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 476-77 (1979) (holding that while
statutes may fashion a complete body of federal law, corporation law is reserved to the states),
and United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993) (holding there is a presumption that
long-established and familiar principals of state law will govern), with Exxon Corp. v. Hunt,
475 U.S. 355, 362 (1986) (holding federal statutory powers preemptive over state law).

34. See Kass, supra note 2, at 3.
35. Glass, supra note 18, at 9.
36. United States v. Bestfoods, 118 S.Ct. 1876, 1886-87 n.12 (1998).
37. Id. at 1881.

38. Id. at 1886.
39. See id.
40. Id. at 1885-86.
41. Besifoods, 118 S. Ct. at 1885-86.

42. Id. at 1888.
43. Sidney S. Arst Co. v. Pipefitters Welfare Educ. Fund, 25 F.3d 417, 420 (7th Cir.

1994).
44. BesOfoods, 118 S. Ct. at 1876.
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Ill. THE COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSATION,
AND LIABILITY ACT

The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act is not as comprehensive as its title suggests. While CERCLA
covers not less than ninety-four pages in the United States Code, including
definitions, response authorities, liability, presidential delegation of powers,
and pollution insurance, it does not address something as fundamental to the
remediation of hazardous waste sites as parent corporation liability. 45
Neither, the legislative history nor the text of the statute provides indications
that Congress intended or did not intend parent corporation liability for the
acts of subsidiaries.46 In general, the legislative history for CERCLA is
relatively sparse, and its provisions are vague.47 Nevertheless, the statute
and its legislative history are complete enough to allow courts to employ an
effective statutory construction scheme starting with the language in the
49
statute itself.48 The language in CERCLA is lengthy and complex.
Therefore, a brief discussion of the statute is warranted in order to put
Bestfoods and other parent corporation liability cases into the proper
perspective.
The main objective of CERCLA is to take decisive action to cleanup or
otherwise make benign the nation's leaking waste sites.5 0 It is remedial
legislation that protects the environment and public health by imposing
retroactive liability.5 The statute was designed to be comprehensive and
gives the President broad power to mandate that private parties and
government agencies alike remediate hazardous waste sites. 2 The President
automatically delegated most of his authority to the EPA in 1981."
CERCLA not only imposes costs on those who are actually responsible for
contamination, damage, injury from chemical poisons, and environmental
harm,54 but it is also designed to encourage voluntary cleanup by private
45. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994 & Supp. 1996).
46. See Amicus Brief of United States Business and Industrial Council in Support of
Respondents at 18, Bestfoods (No. 97-454).
47. See United States v. Cordova Chem. Co. of Mich., 59 F.3d 584, 588 (6th Cir.
1995), rev'd sub nom United States v. Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. 1876 (1998).
48. See Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 144 (1995).
49. 42 U.S.C §§ 9601-9675 (1994 & Supp. 1996).
50. Aronovsky, supra note 6, at 422.
51. See Cordova Chem. Co. of Mich., 59 F.3d at 588.
52. United States v. Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. 1876, 1881 (1998) (quoting Key Tronic
Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 814 (1994)).
53. See Petitioner's Brief at 5, United States v. Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. 1876 (1998) (No.
97-454).
54. Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. at 1882.
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933

parties.5 5 Congress' intent was to limit the defenses that might exist under
state law with regard to the environment5 6 and to abrogate indemnity
agreements which hinder holding responsible parties liable 57 CERCLA's
final goal is to prevent the actual discharge of waste in the first place by
implementing a "national hazardous substance response plan," and putting
potentially liable parties on notice
58 of impending CERCLA claims if no
remedial action is taken at the site.
CERCLA created a "Superfund" into which monies are deposited to
help cleanup the sites that pose the most environmental danger.5 9 The EPA's
job is to recover past and future costs associated with the cleanup plan for
each site in order to replenish the Superfund6 Each site typically requires
tens of millions of dollars to implement a long-term cleanup plan. 1 The key
to CERCLA is to pay for environmental cleanup at the expense of private
responsible parties instead of taxpayers. 62 The CERCLA Superfund receives
a stipend from the government each year in excess of eight billion dollars, 63
which is mainly derivative from taxes on the oil and gas industry. 4 However,
the estimated cost of cleaning up the possible 10,000 national Superfund
sites is three hundred billion dollars.65 For this cost related reason, only a
very small number of sites are acutally being detoxified,66 and less than
eleven percent of those sites are being funded by private responsible parties.
The remaining ninety percent of the cost is "being shouldered" by the
government, Le. the taxpayers. 67
Courts have required several elements to establish liability under
CERCLA. The site, which is the subject of the action, must be considered a
facility. There must have been a release or threatened release of hazardous

55. See Amicus Brief of United States Business nd Industrial Council in Support of
Respondents at 14-15, Bestfoods (No. 97-454).
56. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1994).
57. Id. § 9607(e).
58. Id. §§ 9605(a), (c).

59. d § 9611.
60. See generally United States v. Codova Chem. Co. of Mich., 750 F. Supp. 832, 835
(W.D. Mich. 1990), rev'd sub nom United States v. Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. 1876 (1998).
61. See Glass, supra note 18, at 9.
62. Aronovsky, supra note 6, at 422-23.
63. See id. at 425.
64. Amicus Brief of the Washington Legal Foundation in Support of Respondents at
17, United States v. Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. 1876 (1998) (No. 97-454).
65. Aronovsky, supra note 6, at 424.
66. See id.
67. Id. at 425.
68. See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 703 F. Supp. 455,461 (E.D. Va. 1988).
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materials which occurred at the facility. 69 Such release must have caused the
plaintiff to incur costs to respond to the release.70 Additionally,
the
71
defendant must be a responsible party as defined by CERCLA.
The terms "release" and "facility" have been broadly interpreted by
courts so that they never pose a significant obstacle to the imposition of
liability.12 Under CERCLA, a facility is defined as:
Any building, structure, installation, equipment, pipe or pipeline
(including any pipe into a sewer or publicly owned treatment
works), well, pit, pond, lagoon, impoundment, ditch, landfill,
storage container, motor vehicle, rolling stock, or aircraft or [ ] any
site or area where a hazardous substance has been deposited,
stored, disposed of, or placed, or otherwise come to be located; but
include any consumer product in consumer use or any
does not
73
vessel.

This broad definition has led to little or no leeway in arguing that one's site
is not a facility. Courts have clarified that a facility is only the immediate
area where the hazardous waste has "come to be located" and not the entire
property on which the waste is located. 74 Likewise, disposal occurs not only
through active human conduct, but also refers to passive movements of
hazardous waste through soil, metal, bodies of water, or other means. 75 The
critical determination in CERCLA liability lies in identifying the responsible
party as defined by the act.
The idea of holding responsible parties liable does not impute a
necessity of culpability.76 CERCLA casts a wide net to help pay the costs of
cleaning up the environment.77 The act is "sweeping" in that every party that
may be potentially involved in the disposal of hazardous materials should be
forced to contribute to cleanup efforts at the site in question. 78 Even some of
69. See id.
70. Id.
71. CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Aerojet-Gen. Corp., 777 F. Supp. 549, 570 (W.D. Mich. 1991),
rev'd sub nom United States V. Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. 1876 (1998).
72. Aronovsky, supra note 6, at 429.

73. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9) (1994).
74. E.g., Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837, 842-43 (4th
Cir. 1992).

75. See, e.g., id. at 845.

76. Id. at 846.
77. Amicus Brief of United States Business and Industrial Council in Support of
Respondents at 21, Bestfoods (No. 97-454).

78. United States v. Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. 1876, 1882 n.1 (1998) (quoting
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 21 (1989)).
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the several states have been held liable under the statute for their actions in
releasing already deposited waste during public works projects.79
CERCLA lists the persons who may be held liable for the cleanup costs
associated with a polluted site.80 Those persons include any prior owner or
operator of the facility whose involvement coincided with the release of the
hazardous substance, any present owner or operator of the facility, any
person who arranged for the disposal or transport of the hazardous substance
from the facility, and any person who, by contract or otherwise, actually
transported or disposed of the materials.81 The liability for these owners,
operators, arrangers, and transporters arises from their definite and real
relationship with the facility where the dangerous materials were released
into the ecosystem. 2 A person is defined to include corporations.8 3 To4
operate a facility means to direct the workings of or to manage the facility.8
It is readily apparent that CERCLA was created to hold liable any entity that
was remotely connected with the illegal discharge of hazardous waste into
the environment.
By holding past and present owners, operators,
transporters, and arrangers jointly and severally liable for toxic discharges,
CERCLA attempts to maintain a safety net of cleanup funds.8 5
The comprehensiveness of the responsible party section under
CERCLA is important to understand. Even an entity that owns a nonoperational facility is liable under CERCLA if toxic discharges were made
before the facility went offline1 6 A tenant who exercises control and
authority over a facility can be held liable as well as the owner of the facility
that the tenant rents.8' It follows then that no parties who were affiliated
with the polluting facility in some way can escape liability after a release of
hazardous substances is facilitated.
This assessment, however, is incorrect because there is an entire body
of corporate America that can escape liability based on their status as a
79. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 23 (1989).
80. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1994).

81. Id. § 9607(a)(1)-(3).
82. Amicus Brief of United States Business and Industrial Council in Support of
Respondents at 4, Bestfoods (No. 97-454).
83. 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (21) (1994).

84. Petitioner's Brief at 20, Bestfoods (No. 97-454) (internal quotations omitted)
(quoting OxFoRD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989)).
85. CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Aerojet-Gen. Corp., 777 F. Supp. 549, 554 (W.D. Mich. 1991)
(holding CERCLA a joint and several liability statute unless defendant proves that the harm is
divisible).
86. See Petitioner's Reply Brief at 8, United States v. Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. 1876
(1998) (No. 97-454).
87. See Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837, 842 (4th Cir.
1992).
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88

parent corporation.
CERCLA does not impose direct liability on parent
corporations for illegal discharges made by their subsidiaries. 89 Likewise, an
officer of a corporation that is liable under CERCLA is usually immune from
the statute except where that officer plays a role in the polluting activities of
the corporation. 9° It is up to the courts to interpret CERCLA to determine
under what conditions a parent will be held liable based on CERCLA,
federal, and state laws.
CERCLA's inherent limitations often confine its ability to remedially
enforce its provisions and obtain funds from potentially liable sources. The
Act does not require that federal law be used in interpreting its provisions. 9'
This leads to enforcement difficulties when trying to hold a parent liable for
the acts of its subsidiary because corporation law is derived from state power
and state common law.92 The law presumes that long established and
familiar principles of state law will govern unless a federal statute provides
otherwise.93 CERCLA, therefore, does not cast the widest net available to
remedy environmental woes because the traditional corporate form protects
parent companies. 94 The phrase "corporations will be held liable" does not
suggest that the same corporation's shareholders will be held liable. 95
Therefore, when CERCLA's text states that a "corporation ' may be held
liable, it does not require that the parent corporation, the corporation's
principal shareholder, will be held liable. It may be reasonably concluded,
then, that CERCLA's direct text does not tamper with traditional state
notions of limited liability for corporations.97 This may explain why
CERCLA has been "subjected to a myriad of legal attacks since its
enactment [,]" regarding when and to what extent parent corporations may
be held liable for violations of its provisions.98
CERCLA provides one limited defense to those parties who are
innocent purchasers of contaminated property. 99 The defense provides that
88. See Joslyn Mfg. Co. v. T.L. James Co., 893 F.2d 80, 82 (5th Cir. 1990).

89. Id.
90. United States v. Cordova Chem. Co. of Mich., 21 ENVrL. L. REP. 20805, 20805
(W.D. Mich. 1991).
91. See Amicus Brief of the Washington Legal Foundation in Support of Respondents
at 4, Bestfoods (No. 97-454).
92. See United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993).
93. Id. at 534.
94. See United States v. Cordova Chem. Co. of Mich., 59 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir.
1995), rev'd sub nom Untied States v. Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. 1876 (1998).
95. Respondent's Brief at 20, BesOfoods (No. 97-454).
96. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21) (1994).
97. Glass, supra note 18, at 9.
98. See Aronovsky, supra note 6, at 427.
99. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3) (1994).
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there will be no liability for an otherwise liable party if "an act or omission
of a third party other than an employee or agent of the defendant" resulted in
an illegal release, which was caused solely by that third party, and the
otherwise liable party "exercised due care with respect to the hazardous
substances concerned" and "took precautions against foreseeable acts or
omissions" by the third party.'00 However, if the act or omission on the part
of the third party was in relation to a contractual relationship regarding the
hazardous substance of which the owner was a party, the defense will not
work.01 A release caused by an act of war or God will also remove liability
from any owner.' 2
In addition, a claim by a previous owner that he or she sold the
hazardous material, and its liability with it, will not succeed 0 3 because
CERCLA imposes strict liability on all previous owners.' 4 This is true
regardless of the duration of the ownership of the facility.'0 5 These defenses
are the extent of affirmative defenses available to defeat CERCLA liability.
The only other defense available is to disprove the liability on the merits and
the elements.
The courts, in enforcing and interpreting CERCLA, have proven to be a
powerful ally to the statute. The courts generally construe CERCLA
broadly, paying particular attention to its remedial purpose, and make rulings
that flow from policy considerations rather than abstract legal principles.
Courts recognize that Congress gave the statute wide latitude to shift the
costs of cleanup actions under the CERCLA from public entities to private
responsible parties.1' 7 Therefore, the courts usually follow the route to a
cleaner environment proscribed in CERCLA and defer to its remedial
purpose. 08
The nation's courts have prescribed rights that defendants have under
the statute. It is well settled that private responsible parties may make
binding and enforceable agreements to apportion the cleanup costs under
CERCLA between joint defendants' 9 Parties held liable, or parties that
settle the case with the EPA, may seek contribution from any and all other
100. Id. § 9607(b)(3).

101. Id.
102. Id. § 9607(b)(1)-(2).
103. Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837, 847 (4th Cir. 1992).

104. Id. at 841.
105. See id. at 844.
106. CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Aerojet-Gen. Corp., 777 F. Supp. 549, 571 (W.D. Mich. 1991),
rev'd sub nom United States v. Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. 1876 (1998).

107. Aronovsky, supra note 6, at 426.
108. Id. at 429.
109. Cordova Chem. Co. v. Department of Natural Resources, 536 N.W.2d 860, 863
(Mich. Ct. App. 1995).
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responsible parties under the act.110 Being accused of a CERCLA violation
does not crush an entity's options; it simply forces someone involved, and
possibly everybody involved, to cleanup his or her own mess.
CERCLA, in one overly complex statement, provides that the United
States can no longer tolerate short-term economic gain at the expense of
long-term environmental health."'
The true costs of producing
environmentally harmful chemicals must fall upon those who profit from
their production. The preceding discussion of the CERCLA statute will
assist in a proper understanding of the information in the proceeding
sections. An entire body of law has arisen out of the complexities contained
in CERCLA. This body of law incorporates everything from simple civil
procedure issues to complex issues of state versus federal law.
IV. THE LIABILITY THEORIES PRECEDING BESTFOODS
Because CERCLA does not speak directly to the issue of parent
corporation liability for the acts of subsidiaries, the courts were left to
struggle with the concept in order to find a resolution that preserved the
corporate form but allowed liability where it was deserved. The courts
always start with the language included in the statute when interpreting a
legislative enactment.
Then, the courts must determine the meaning of a
term or section in the statute by considering first its bare definition, and then
its placement and purpose in the overall statutory scheme. 1 3 CERCLA's
overall statutory scheme is to take decisive action to clean up or otherwise
make benign the nation's leaking waste sites.114 Therefore, the meaning of
"persons"' 5 in CERCLA must have been meant to include parent
corporations if they had something to do with the waste produced. "The
'1 6
meaning of statutory language, plain or not, [always] depends on context."
The silence of Congress on this parent corporation liability issue has
sparked widespread and nonuniform interpretation of CERCLA in the
nation's courts.1

110. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(3)(B) (1994); Trinity Indus., Inc. v. Dixie Carriers, No. 902349, 1992 WL 161123 *2 at *8 (E.D. La. June 24, 1992).
111. See Gore, supra note 8, at xxi.
112. Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 144 (1995) (quoting Brown v. Gardner,
513 U.S. 115, 118 (1994) (citing King v. St.Vincent's Hosp., 502 U.S. 215, 221 (1991)).
113. Id. at 145.
114. Aronovsky, supra note 6, at 422.
115. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21) (1994).
116. Bailey, 516 U.S. at 145.
117. See supra note 33.
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CERCLA provides no direct means of attaching a parent corporation for
1
However, it is
its subsidiary's acts in violation of the Act's provisions."
well known that CERCLA's general thrust is to extend liability to all parties
involved in bringing about dangerous environmental conditions.! 9 This
thrust is in direct conflict with the tenet that a corporation and its
2 It
stockholders must be treated as separate entities in the eyes of the law. W
is entirely acceptable that a corporation is used specifically as an insulator
from liability on statutory assessments. Limited liability is a hallmark of
corporation law.121 However, the desirable and socially beneficial protection
of limited liability must be surrendered "when the sacrifice is essential to the
end that some accepted public policy may be defended or upheld.1 2
Although never directly stated, the courts of the United States must
consider the cleanliness of the environment to be an accepted public policy
because they have found several ways to limit limited liability in the
CERCLA context.123 The nation's courts have for the most part applied two
different standards in determining whether a parent corporation can be held
liable for illegal discharges made by its subsidiary. The first standard
involves looking to the amount of control that the parent corporation
exercises over the subsidiary; if the requisite amount of control exists, then
the parent may be held liable. 124 The second standard involves looking
closely at the relationship between the parent and the subsidiary to see if
piercing the corporate veil is warranted.2's There are two main theories
behind piercing the corporate veil: alter ego theory and mere instrumentality
However, the two theories are identical in substance and only
theory.
differ in form.'2 7
It is essential to remember that the theory of direct liability through
control and the theory of derivative liability through piercing the corporate
veil are separate, unique, and noninterchangeable, but they are equally as

118. Aronovsky, supra note 6, at 422.
119. Schiavone v. Pearce, 79 F.3d 248, 253 (2d Cir. 1996).
120. Burnet v. Clark, 287 U.S. 410,415 (1932).
121. See Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U.S. 349, 361 (1944).
122. Id. at 362 (quoting Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 155 N.E. 58, 95 (N.Y. 1926)
(Cardozo, J.)) (internal quotations omitted).
123. See supra note 33.
124. See, e.g., Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Beazer E., Inc., 124 F.3d 551, 563 (3d Cir.
1997).
125. See, e.g., United States v. Jon-T Chem., Inc., 768 F.2d 686, 691 (5th Cir. 1985);
Aronovsky, supra note 6, at 423.

126. See Aronovsky, supra note 6, at 432.
127. See id. at 430-31.
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effective in finding liability over parent corporations.' 2 A conflict arose
over veil-piercing regarding whether to apply state corporate veil-piercing
laws or to use federal standards in the context of CERCLA. "Ultimately, the
question facing the courts is whether to adhere to the traditional common
law rule strictly limiting [parent] liability, or instead to look beyond the
formalities of separate corporate existence and impose direct CERCLA
liability on parent corporations and individual shareholders." 29
Up until Bestfoods, the lower courts around the United States differed
on whether to apply state or federal veil-piercing standards. The general
consensus was that federal law governs the question of CERCLA liability,
but state law is not irrelevant because "corporations are creatures of state
law. 130 Some statutes allow courts to fashion a new body of federal law to
usurp state law, but corporate law is not such a body of law.13 1 Nevertheless,
if the state law allows an action that is prohibited by the federal law or the
application of state law is inconsistent with federal policy, then federal law
must displace the state law. 1 32 In addition, the Fifth Circuit has ruled that
federal law governs whenever a case involves the rights of the United States
under a nationwide federal program.1 33 Under these rules, it would seem that
environmental protection is consistent with national policy and that a clean
environment is a right of the United States as defined by CERCLA.
Notwithstanding the previous discussion, many courts hold that federal
law may never intrude into veil-piercing under CERCLA. In order to
abrogate state law, a federal statute must directly apply to the question
addressed by the state common law.' 34 Nothing in the legislative history of
CERCLA indicates that Congress intended to alter the basic tenets of state
corporation common law,1 35 nor does the text of the statute itself indicate
that federal corporate law should be presumed. 136 It is agreed, however, that
no state may empower its corporations to disregard federal laws or
policies. 37 Regardless of whether state or federal law is used to determine
whether piecing the corporate veil is warranted, piercing the veil is the only

128. See Sidney S. Arst Co. v. Pipefitters Welfare Educ. Fund, 25 F.3d 417, 420 (7th
Cir. 1994).
129. Aronovsky, supra note 6, at 435-36.
130. See, e.g., Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 478 (1979) (quoting Cort v. Ash, 422
U.S. 66, 84 (1977)).

131. Id.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

See, e.g., id. at 479.
United States v. Jon-T Chem., Inc., 768 F.2d 686, 690 n.6 (5th Cir. 1985).
E.g., United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993).
Joslyn Mfg. Co. v. T.L. James Co., 893 F.2d 80, 82 (5th Cir. 1990).
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1994 & Supp. 1996).
E.g., Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U.S. 349, 365 (1944).
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indirect way in which a parent corporation can be held liable for illegal toxic
releases made by its subsidiary under CERCLA.
"Piercing the corporate veil is the most litigated issue in corporate law,
yet it remains among the least understood."138 Veil-piercing derives from the
abuse of the corporate form's single most valuable asset of limited
liability. 139 "It is legitimate for [people] to stake only a part of their fortune
When a corporation abuses the protection provided by
on an enterprise."
the corporate form as a vehicle to achieve an unjust result, courts would
remove limited liability. This removal is known as piercing the cbrporate
veil.14 1 All that veil-piercing consists of is enforcing a judgement against a
shareholder of a corporation for the acts of that corporation.1 42 The two
types of veil-piercing used are alter ego and mere instrumentality theories. 43
Both theories involve proving that the two entities were so intermingled that
they ceased to exist as separate entities.144 However, some jurisdictions
require fraud in order to pierce the corporate veil.145
When a parent company completely dominates and controls the
subsidiary or operates the subsidiary as a business conduit of the parent
company, the subsidiary is considered an alter ego of the parent. If the
subsidiary is an alter ego, then a court may pierce the corporate veil and hold
the parent liable for the acts of the subsidiary. 146 If the corporation is
established to perpetrate a fraud or to commit an illegal act, or if the parent
drains the subsidiary's assets, limited liability will not apply, and the veil
will be pierced.1 47 The existence of interlocking directorates is not enough to
pierce a corporate veil where there is no evidence of fraud or wrongdoing on
the part of the parent. 48 Neither one hundred percent ownership of the
subsidiary by the parent nor the parent having the same officers as the

138. Marilyn Blumberg Cane & Robert Barnett, Piercing the Corporate Veil in
Florida: Defining Improper Conduct, 21 NovA L. RE'. 663, 665 (Winter 1997) (internal

quotations omitted) (quoting Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An
EmpiricalStudy, 76 CoRNELLL. Ray. 1036, 1036 (1991)).
139. Id. Liability after a corporate investment usually will not exceed the amount
invested.
140. Id. (internal quotes omitted) (quoting Douglas and Shanks, Insulation from
Liability Through Subsidiary Corporations,39 YALE L.J. 193, 193-94 (1929)).
141. Id.
142. See id. at 666.
143. Cane, supra note 138, at 667.

144. Id.
145. Id.
146. United States v. Jon-T Chem., Inc., 768 F.2d 686, 691 (5th Cir. 1985).

147. Id.
148. American Protein Corp. v. AB Volvo, 844 F.2d 56, 60 (2d Cir. 1988).
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49
subsidiary
is, by itself, sufficient to pierce the veil under the alter ego
theory.1
In alter ego, the parent actually controls the subsidiary without regard to
its being a distinct entity, so the two are but one entity. The acts of one are
therefore the acts of all, and the veil may be pierced. 50 The following
factors indicate that a subsidiary is the alter ego of a parent: 1) commonality
of stock ownership; 2) commonality of directors and owners; 3)
commonality of business departments; 4) consolidated financial statements
and tax returns; 5) the parent finances the subsidiary; 6) the parent created or
caused the incorporation of the subsidiary; 7) the subsidiary operates on an
extremely inadequate amount of capital; 8) the parent pays the salaries and
expenses of the subsidiary; 9) the subsidiary receives business based solely
upon grant of the parent; 10) the parent uses the subsidiary's property as if it
were its own; 11) the daily operations of the two entities are not kept
separate; and 12) the subsidiary does not practice the usual corporate
formalities. 5'
The mere instrumentality theory requires control just like the alter ego
theory. However, the exact wording of the theory deviates from the alter ego
theory. The control must be present to such an extent that the subservient
company has no distinct corporate interests of its own and operates only to
achieve the purposes of the parent corporation. 52 A domination of finances,
policies, and practices that control the corporation must occur so that the
subsidiary has "no separate mind, will [,] or existence.' ' 53 The difference
between alter ego and mere instrumentality is that with mere instrumentality,
there are no factors; there are simply three concrete elements: 1) control by
the parent company; 2) the control exercised by the parent was used to
perpetrate a fraud or worse; and 3) the control caused the specific injury
complained of in that case. 54 The courts acknowledge that although a parent
is an entity unique from its subsidiary, sometimes the corporate fiction must
be overlooked to inhibit fraud. In such
55 a case, the subsidiary must be treated
as an instrumentality of the parent.
The Fifth Circuit believes no direct liability for parent cor1.orations
This
exists under CERCLA unless the corporate veil can be pierced.
circuit also limits veil-piercing to situations where the corporate form is used

149.
150.
151.
152.

Jon-TChem., 768 F.2d at 691.
Fisser v. International Bank, 282 F.2d 231, 234 (2d Cir. 1960).
Jon-TChem., 768 F.2d at 691-92.
Id. at 691.

153. Id.
154. Fisser,282 F.2d at 238.
155. Buechner v. Farbenfabriken Bayer Aktiengesellschaft, 154 A.2d 684, 687 (Del.
1959).
156. Joslyn Mfg. Co. v. T.L. James & Co., 893 F.2d 80, 83 (5th Cir. 1990).
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as a sham, to perpetrate fraud, or solely to avoid personal liability. 15 7 The
Eastern District of Louisiana agrees that a parent may be held liable under
CERCLA only if the veil can be pierced.'r 8 The only problem with this
theory is that the conditions under which the veil may be pierced are
different in each state. In California, for example, one may pierce the veil
when the unity between the parent and the subsidiary causes their separate
personalities to no longer exist and adherence to the corporate form would
promote injustice. 159 California's reasoning differs from many states' veilpiercing laws and illustrates the need for uniformity in federal CERCLA
actions.
To complicate the matter even further, some courts apply the federal
veil-piercing standard when deciding parent corporation liability under
CERCLA." A district court in Massachusetts applied federal veil-piercing
standards in reviewing CERCLA claims against parent companies.16 The
court's reasoning was that policies underlying CERCLA directed a federal
veil-piercing review. 62 The Third Circuit also felt it was necessary to use
federal veil-piercing standards in order to achieve uniformity in the
application of CERCLA. 6 ' Remember, piercing the corporate veil is not the
only way in which a parent can be held liable for the acts of its subsidiaries;
there is also a control test by which a parent could be held liable as an
operator under CERCLA.164
Many courts allow for both the actual control standard to be used in
finding direct CERCLA liability, and veil-piercing to be used to find indirect
liability for parent companies. The test under the actual control standard is
whether or not the parent substantially and actively participates in the dayto-day activities of the subsidiary company. 65 The type of control necessary
can also be expressed as control which evinces the parent's "exclusive
domination.., to the point that the subsidiary no longer has legal or

157. Id.
158. Trinity Indus., Inc. v. Dixie Carriers, Inc., No. 90-2349, 1992 WL 161123 at *3
(E.D. La. June 24, 1992).
159. Aronovsky, supra note 6, at 431.
160. See, e.g., In re Acushnet River, 675 F. Supp. 22, 31 (D. Mass. 1987).

161. Id. at 31.
162. Id. at 32.
163. Lansford-Coaldale Joint Water Auth. v. Tonolli Corp., 4 F.3d 1209, 1225 (3d Cir.
1993).

164. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(20)(A)-(21) (1994 & Supp. 1996).
165. Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Beazer E., Inc., 124 F.3d 551, 563 (3d Cir. 1997);
Martignetti v. Haigh-Farr, Inc., 680 N.E.2d 1131, 1138 (Mass. 1997).
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independent significance of its own.' 66 Direct liability under operator status
is conferred when the parent has such extreme control over the subsidiary's
activity that it becomes an operator subject to direct liability. 167
There must be more than mere ownership and the control that is
incidental to ownership to find parent liability under CERCLA.168 Owning
stock is not enough; 6 9 there must be actual participation in the conduct that
led to the release causing CERCLA liability. 70 The normal amount of
oversight that any prudent investor would give to an investment is not
construed as worthy of direct liability, although it does represent a certain
degree of control.17 Some courts narrow the control test to require that the
parent be actively involved in the day-to-day operations of the actual facility
that is the subject of the CERCLA action. The actual control test does not
appear to differ wholeheartedly from veil-piercing standards, but the
distinction will become important in the context of the Besifoods case.
One last important issue that often presented itself in the cases before
Bestfoods was corporate officer liability. An officer of a corporation
charged with CERCLA violations is not liable unless that officer spent a lot
of time at the actual facility where the release was made, had73the opportunity
to participate in the illegal release, and directed such release.
It is important to understand that this was the mindset of the courts as
the Bestfoods case came to the docket. There were two forms of liability for
parent corporations under CERCLA: a parent could be directly liable as an
operator of the polluting subsidiary, or a parent could be indirectly liable as
an owner of the polluting subsidiary through veil-piercing.

166. E.g., Caribbean Broad. Sys. Ltd. v. Cable & Wireless PLC, 148 F.3d 1080, 1088
(1998) (citing Outokumpu Eng'g Enter. v. Kvaerner Enviropower, Inc., 685 A.2d 724 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1996)).
167. See United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 910 F.2d 24, 28 (1st Cir. 1990).
168. Id. at 27; See generally Kingston Dry Dock Co. v. Lake Champlain Transp. Co.,
31 F.2d 265, 267 (2d Cir. 1929).
169. E.g., Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 155 N.E. 58, 58 (N.Y. 1926) (Cardozo, J.).
170. E.g., Jacksonville Elec. Auth. v. Bernuth Corp., 996 F.2d 1107, 1110 (1 1th Cir.
1993).
171. E.g., Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Beazer E., Inc., 124 F.3d 551, 563 (3d Cir. 1997).
172. E.g., Lansford-Coaldale Joint Water Auth. v. Tonolli Corp., 4 F.3d 1209, 1220
(3d Cir. 1993).
173. See, e.g., Riverside Mkt. Dev. Corp. v. International Bldg. Prod., Inc., 931 F.2d
327, 330 (5th Cir. 1991).
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V. HISTORY OF UNITED STATES V. BESTFOODS

A.

Facts of the Case

The contaminated site ('The Site") which is the subject of the Besifoods
case is located near Muskegon, Michigan. It is a rural setting in western
Michigan. There is a southeasterly flow of groundwater beneath The Site
toward and The Unnamed Tributary and Little Bear Creek. From 1959 until
1986, the Site was used by many chemical companies to produce
pharmaceutical, veterinary, and agricultural synthetic, organic, and
intermediate chemicals.1 74
Ott Chemical Company ("Ott r') owned and operated The Site from
1957 until 1965. Then, in 1965, a different Ott Chemical Company ("Ott
IF') bought The Site. Ott II was a wholly-owned subsidiary of CPC
International ("CPC"). 7 5 CPC placed some of its own employees on the
board of Ott II.176 Ott II tendered The Site to Story Chemical Company
("STCC") in 1972. STCC was then declared bankrupt in 1977.77
Shortly thereafter, the Michigan Department of Natural Resources
("DNR") attempted to find new buyers for The Site to assist in its cleanup.
They simultaneously investigated the extent of the environmental
degradation and remedies available at The Site. DNR entered into
negotiations with Aerojet-General Corporation ("Aerojet") and its
subsidiary, Cordova Chemical Company ("Cordova"), which resulted in
Cordova Chemical Company of California ("Cordova Cal".), Aerojet's
wholly-owned subsidiary, purchased The Site from the STCC bankruptcy
trustee. In 1978, Cordova Chemical Company of Michigan ("Cordova
Mich.") bought the site from Cordova Cal. and owns it to this day.
Operations, however, ceased at The Site in 1986.171
When tested in 1957, the groundwater beneath The Site was in a pure
and potable condition. After the groundwater was again tested in 1964,
seven years since chemical production had started, the groundwater showed
contamination. This contamination was a result of pumping water into The
Site for use in production and then pumping the water out of The Site.179

174. CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Aerojet-Gen. Corp., 777 F. Supp. 549, 555 (W.D. Mich. 1991),
rev'd sub nom United States v. Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. 1876 (1998).
175. CPC changed its name to Bestfoods shortly after litigation began.
176. Respondent's Brief at 5, Bestfoods (No. 97-454).

177. CPC Int'l, 777 F. Supp. at 555.

178. Id.
179. Id.
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Because of waste disposal at The Site, surface water, groundwater, and soil
were contaminated with a large volume of toxic substances.' 80
During the periods when Ott I and Ott H owned The Site, chemical
wastewater was dumped into unlined, engineered lagoons on the
northwestern edge of The Site. Many contaminants then seeped into the
ground and local waters from the lagoons. No waste, however, was dumped
into the lagoons when STCC or Cordova owned The Site."8
Ott I and II also buried hundreds of chemical-filled drums in a sandy pit
on The Site. These drums eventually ruptured causing further soil
contamination and water contamination through leachate. In addition, all of
the owners through the present allowed major chemical overflows and spills,
which they failed to clean up; instead, the materials were buried. In one
such case, a train car full of hazardous chemicals spilled onto The Site's
railroad tracks. 82
The contamination eventually reached the water supply of the
surrounding community. By 1981, the groundwater that was extracted
looked like brown root beer and contained foam. The air had a foul stench
from chemicals that permeated everything. The soil and grounds of The Site
were purple from the toxins released. In addition, there were many
containers randomly thrown about that were exploding, leaking, corroding,
and crushed. Free roaming traces of phenol,
methylene, benzene, methyl
83
isocyanate, and chloride were on The Site.
Regardless of how the contaminants entered the ground, they eventually
reached, through soil movement and leaching, The Unnamed Tributary and
Little Bear Creek. Ott I and Ott II attempted to use purge wells'14 to slow
down the proliferation of hazardous materials. STCC and Cordova,
however, did not make use of these purge wells, thus allowing an unchecked
spread of contamination from the Site.'
Cordova Mich. and Cordova Cal. did not dump or bury waste. The two
companies repaired the sewage system and equalization tanks, which were
required for the sewage system to function properly, and all chemical waste
was pumped offsite to a county treatment facility. Nevertheless, benzene

180. Id. at 555-56.

181. Id. at 556.
182. CPCInt'l, 777 F. Supp. at 556.
183. Kass, supra note 2, at 3.
184. CPC Int'l, 777 F. Supp. at 556. Purge wells are deep and wide wells that
penetrate the earth far below the water table. When in operation, they pump water from the
groundwater beneath a contaminated site and create a cone of depression whereby water will
not flow past the site, but up into the well. Therefore, any contaminants will not pass beyond
the site in question.

185. Id.
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and one half dichloroethane, used exclusively on this site by the Cordova
186
companies, was found in large quantities in the soil and groundwater.
In 1981, federal action began when the EPA investigated The Site. By
1982, the EPA placed The Site on the national priority list and ranked The
Site the 137th most in need of federal remedial action. As of 1991, the EPA
had a three-phased plan to repair the groundwater, surface water, and soil in
and surrounding The Site. Implementation of the plan will cost many
millions of dollars.1 7
B.

ProceduralPostureof the Case

This litigation included many consolidated claims regarding who should
be held liable for cleanup costs under CERCLA1 81 CPC, Aerojet, Cordova
Mich., the Michigan DNR, and the United States were all parties to this
action.18 9 InMay and June of 1991, the United States District Court for the
Western District of Michigan conducted a fifteen-day trial to determine who
was responsible for cleanup costs at the site in question.'90 There was a
windstorm of cross-claims, counterclaims, and contribution claims.' 91 The
district court then consolidated the case into three phases: remedy,
insurance, and liability. 192 The trial on the first phase of liability included
twenty-nine live testimonial witnesses, 2300 exhibits, and dozens of
transcribed depositions.'93 The trial court found4 that CPC, Cordova, and
Aerojet were liable as operators under CERCLA.'9
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, ruling with a
divided panel, 195 first reversed in part and remanded the case back to the
district court.196 The court of appeals then granted a rehearing en banc and
vacated its previous judgement.? Inthe court of appeals' second swing at
the plate, it again reversed in part and remanded by a seven-to-six
majority.198 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.; 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607, 9613 et seq.
189. CPC Int'l, 777 F. Supp. at 549.

190. Id. at 555-70.
191. United States v. Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. 1876, 1883 (1998).

192. Id.
193. CPCInt'l, 777 F. Supp. at 554.
194. Id. at 581.
195. Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. at 1883.
196. United States v. Cordova Chem. Co. of Mich., 59 F.3d 584, 593 (6th Cir. 1995).
197. United States v. Cordova Chem. Co. of Mich., 67 F.3d 586, 586 (6th Cir. 1995).
198. United States v. Cordova Chem. Co. of Mich., 113 F.3d 572, 583 (6th Cir. 1997),
rev'd sub nom United States v. Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. 1876 (1998)
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the conflict between the circuits regarding parent corporation liability under
CERCLA.0 The Court heard the case on March 24, 1998 and made its
ruling on June 8, 1998.01
C.

The District CourtDecision

CERCLA, according to the district court, imposes strict, joint and
several liability whenever there is a release at a site, and the statute must be
interpreted broadly to avoid frustrating its remedial purpose.202 The court
held that liability under CERCLA could attach to a parent corporation in two
ways: either directly, as operator3 of the subsidiary, or indirectly, when the
corporate veil could be pierced."
Liability through operator status occurs only when the parent exerts
influence or power over the subsidiary by forcefully participating in and
exerting control over the subsidiary's business operations during the time of
the waste disposal. 2°4 Oversight of the subsidiary that is consistent with the
investment relationship will not create such liability.20 5 To determine if the
appropriate "nexus of control"' ' 6 was present, the court considered the
following factors: 1) the parent's representation on the subsidiary's board of
directors; 2) the parent's management of the subsidiary; 3) the parent's daily
involvement with the subsidiary; 4) the overlapping policies between the
parent and the subsidiary; and 5) management, waste disposal, finance, and
personnel policies 07z
The district court also ruled that that a parent could be held liable
through indirect or vicarious liability via traditional state law governed
methods of veil-piercing.208 In Michigan, a three-pronged veil-piercing test
is used to "prevent fraud, illegality or injustice."2 0 The elements of the test
require the following: 1) that the subsidiary is an instrumentality of the
parent; 2) that the limited liability between the parent and the subsidiary was
specifically used to perpetrate a fraud or evil; and 3) that the fraud or evil
199. United States v. CPC Int'l, Inc., 118 S. Ct. 621 (1997), rev'd sub nom United
States v. Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. 1876 (1998).
200. Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. at 1884.

201. Id. at 1876.
202. CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Aerojet-Gen. Corp., 777 F. Supp. 549, 554, 571-72 (W.D.
Mich. 1991), rev'd sub nom United States v. Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. 1876 (1998).
203. Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. at 1883; CPCInt'l, 777 F. Supp. at 572.
204. CPC Int'l, 777 F. Supp at 573.

205. Id.
206. Id. at 577.

207. Id. at 573.
208. Id. at 574.
209. CPC Int'l, 777 F. Supp. at 574.
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caused the injury to the plaintiff.210 Michigan law allows for an exception in
that veil-piercing may also be warranted when it is done to serve the interests
of justice. 21 1 The fiction of separate corporate entities is disregarded if the
two companies have identical interests so as to suggest that the subsidiary
212
was an alter ego of the parent.
The court reasoned that CPC was directly liable as an operator with
regard to The Site because it significantly controlled its subsidiary's
decisionmaking and business, even though neither CPC nor its former
subsidiary still owned The Site.213 Internally, CPC installed its officers on
the board of Ott II, and externally, CPC imposed policies of development on
Ott ]1.214 These actions established, for the trial court, that CPC reached the
nexus of control such that they assumed responsibility for the release of
hazardous waste.2 5 In addition, Cordova Cal. was subject to indirect
CERCLA owner liability through veil-piercing because its subsidiary owned
the site in question; Cordova Cal. was the sole shareholder of Cordova Mich.
stock, and there was an identity of interest between the companies. 6 The
intermediate parent here exercised dominion and control over its subsidiary
to the point where the corporate fiction ceased to exist, and the parent was
therefore held liable.217
This decision established that the United States District Court for the
Western District of Michigan would no longer allow parent corporations to
escape liability under CERCLA. It seemed like an important victory for the
environmental movement in the United States. However, The Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit of the United States added its two cents to the
issue.
D.

The Court ofAppeals Decision

The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed in part and
remanded after rehearing the case.21 ' The court held, like in the district court
decision,2 19 that it would not interpret CERCLA in such a way that frustrated
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 574-75.
CPC Int'l, 777 F. Supp. at 574-75.
Id. at 577.
Id. at 578-79.
Id.

218. United States v. Cordova Chem. Co. of Mich., 113 F.3d 572,586 (6th Cir. 1997),
rev'd sub nom United States v. Besffoods, 118 S. Ct. 1876 (1998).
219. CPC Int'l, 777 F. Supp. at 571-72.
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CERCLA's underlying policy 2m However, it limited the deference it would
give to the statute in that it would only assess liability on those parties that
were culpable, or by some realistic measure contributed to the creation of the
harmful conditions. 22 ' The court refused to hold parent corporations liable
for the acts of their subsidiaries unless the corporate veil could be pierced,
thus rejecting the district court's view that actual control could bring about
direct liability. 222
The focus of the opinion was whether the parent abused the corporate
form in such a way that the separation between corporation and stockholder
disappeared. 223 The court then applied Michigan state law with regard to
veil-piercing, just as the district court did.22 However, in applying the
Michigan veil-piercing standard, the court ruled that the facts in this case did
not warrant a piercing of the corporate veil.22 While CPC was found to have
had an active role with Cordova, the court found that the degree of control it
exercised did not force the separate personalities of parent and subsidiary to
cease to exist. In addition, there was no showing that the corporate form was
utilized to accomplish fraud or wrongdoing. 6 The court also let Cordova
Cal. off the hook by pronouncing that its brief period of ownership, before it
transferred The Site to Cordova Mich., did not put it in a position to incur
previous owner liability under CERCLA. 27
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit's ruling in this case
accomplished three things.
First, it allowed two potentially liable
companies with deep pockets to escape liability for environmental crimes for
which they clearly should have been responsible under CERCLA. 2 9 Second,
it set a precedent calling for the use of state law to determine parent
corporation liability under CERCLA.230 Third, the court removed the
possibility of direct operator-status liability for parent corporations under
CERCLA.2 31 Contrary to its pontifications in the beginning of the opinion, 2
it would seem that the court did indeed frustrate the remedial purpose of

220. Cordova Chem. Co. of Mich., 113 F.3d at 577.

221.
222.
223.
224.

Id. at 578.
Id. at 580.
Id.
Id.

225. Cordova Chem. Co. of Mich., 113 F.3d at 581.

226. Id.
227. Id. at 583.
228. Id. at 572.
229. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3) (1994).
230. Cordova Chem. Co. of Mich., 113 F.3d at 580.
231. Id. at 580.
232. Id. at 577.
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CERCLA. In one ruling, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals managed to set
the environmental cause back eighteen years.
VI. UNITED STATES V. BESTFOODS

A.

Petitioner'sArgument

There were three briefs submitted in support of the United States, the
petitioner, in United States v. Bestfoods? 3 The United States submitted a
brief and a reply brief,2 and the respondent, Michigan Department of6
5
Environmental Quality,23 submitted a brief in support of the petitioner.2
According to the Solicitor General for the United States, The Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals misapplied CERCLA, the most important statute which
allows the United States to remedy public dangers created by toxic
materials. 7 The Court of Appeals' ruling absolved all parent corporations
of liability under CERCLA even when they actively participate in the
operations of the polluting site.2 38 By only allowing parent liability when the
circumstances warrant a piercing of the corporate veil, the Sixth Circuit is
alienating the broader view held by the First, Second, Third, and Eleventh
Circuit Courts of Appeals, which all allow for some sort of control test to
find direct liability for parents as operators under CERCLA.239
In the petitioner's opinion, this case's main issue is one of simple
statutory construction.m State common law veil-piercing standards should
not apply.24 The United States wants the Supreme Court to "apply the
[CERCLA] statute as Congress wrote it."2 2 The definition of "owner" in
CERCLA specifically excludes stockholders who do not participate in

233. Respondent Michigan Department of Environmental Quality's Brief in Support of
Petitioner (No. 97-454); Petitioner's Brief (No. 97454); Petitioner's Reply Brief (No. 97-

454).
234. Petitioner's Brief at I, Bes~foods (No. 97-454); Petitioner's Reply Brief at I,

Bestfoods (No. 97-454).
235. Formerly known as Michigan Department of Natural Resources.
236. Respondent Michigan Department of Environmental Quality's Brief in Support of

Petitioner at I, Besifoods (No. 97-454).
237. Petitioner's Brief at 16, Bestfoods (No. 97-454).
238. Id.
239. Respondent Michigan Department of Environmental Quality's Brief in Support of

Petitioner at 14, Bestfoods (No. 97-454).
240. Id. at 6.

241. Id.
242. Petitioner's Reply Brief at 15, BesOfoods (No. 97-454) (citing Dunn v. CFTC, 117
S. Ct. 913, 916 (1997)).
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managing the facility where the release occurred. 243 This suggests that a
stockholder who does participate in the management of the site is susceptible
to liability. 4 The statutory term "operator" in CERCLA must be interpreted
in terms of its plain and ordinary meaning as opposed to an unusual or
technical meaning. 245 The plain meaning of "to operate" is to "direct the
workings of [or] to manage. ' ' 4
Congress wanted to impose liability on any operator of the site in
question, regardless of protection provided by the corporate form.247 CPC,
the United States argues, was an operator as defined by CERCLA, because it
actively controlled the operations of the facility where the illegal release was
made.
Understand, however, that the petitioner is no longer referring to
active control of the subsidiary's business; instead, it is saying that CPC had
extensive control over the decision-making at The Site, which therefore
shows that CPC operated The Site. 249 This is direct liability in its most
forward form; there is nothing vicarious about it; CPC physically controlled
operations at The Site.20 CPC's argument that operator status is only
conferred when a corporation mechanically operates a polluting facility
would produce an absurd result because parents could control decisionmaking at a facility but others would be subject to liability for the parents'
decisions.2' Any sort of managerial control over the facility is enough to
obtain CERCLA liability over a parent.z 2 The United States suggests that
there could never be anything bad, even considering limited liability, about
requiring a corporation to pay for the harm it causes.
The petitioner also argued that a federal veil-piercing standard must be
used instead of the various state standards when interpreting parent liability
under CERCLA. 4 CERCLA specifically precludes the use of all state

243. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A)(iii) (1994).
244. Respondent Michigan Department of Environmental Quality's Brief in Support of
Petitioner at 7, Bestfoods (No. 97-454) (citing United States v. Cordova Chem. Co. of Mich.,
113 F.3d 572, 587 (6th Cir. 1997), rev'd sub nom United States v. Bestfoods, 118 S.Ct. 1876
(1998)).
245. Petitioner's Brief at 20, Bestfoods (No. 97-454).
246. Id. (internal quotations omitted) (citing e.g., OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed.
1989)).

247. Id. at 25.
248. Petitioner's Reply Brief at 1, Bestfoods (No. 97-454).
249. Id. at 3.
250. Id.

251. See id. at 5.
252. Id. at 6.
253. Petitioner's Reply Brief at 17, Besifoods (No. 97-454).

254. Petitioner's Brief at 32, Bestfoods (No. 97-454).
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common law defenses in attempting to escape owner or operator liability.25
Therefore, the use of the state veil-piercing doctrine is impossible under
CERCLA. In addition, all fifty states have different veil-piercing standards.
Resorting to all of those different standards would be inconsistent,
unpredictable, ad hoc, and inappropriate in terms of CERCLA. 6 The
statute must be interpreted uniformly across the United States, employing
only federal veil-piercing standards. 25'
As its final argument, Petitioner discusses the fact that CPC placed its
own corporate officers on the boards of directors of Ott II25 It is normal for
a corporate parent to place its own officers on the board of a subsidiary, and
that alone does not impute liability under CERCLA.2 9 However, CPC's
officers on the board of Ott II performed their duties on behalf of CPC and
not on behalf of Cordova; therefore, they represent an instrumentality of
CPC, which directed the functioning of Ott Il's facility.26
The petitioner presented a lucid and coherent argument. Nothing
presented in the argument was untrue or vague. However, it seems that
because the United States was on the side of what is right and good in the
world, it felt it did not have to present an aggressive argument that would
induce an emotional reaction in the Supreme Court Justices. It was a good
argument that made its point effectively, but it did not call for decisive
action to cleanup a life-threatening source of pollution.
B.

Respondent's Argument

There were four briefs submitted in support of Bestfoods, the
262
Respondent.21 Bestfoods itself submitted a brief and a supplemental brief,
and the other two briefs were amicus briefs submitted by The Washington
Legal Foundation and The United States Business and Industrial Council.
Respondent argued that Congress did not give the courts a license to develop

255. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1994); Petitioner's Reply Brief at 12, Besifoods (No. 97-

454).
256. Petitioner's Reply Brief at 16, BesOfoods (No. 97-454).

257.
258.
259.
260.
261.

See id. at 16.
Petitioner's Brief at 45, Bestfoods (No. 97-454).
Id. at 44.
Id. at45.
Formerly doing business as CPC International.

262. Respondent's Brief, Bestfoods, (No. 97-454); Respondent's Supplemental Brief,

Bestfoods, (No. 97-454).
263. Amicus Brief of the Washington Legal Foundation in Support of Respondents,
Bestfoods, (No. 97-454); Amicus Brief of United States Business and Industrial Council in
Support of Respondents, Besifoods, (No. 97-454).
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ad hoc rules of corporate parent liability in terms of CERCLA. 264 The courts
are not permitted to legislate via CERCLA. 265 Federal intervention into the
basic premises of state corporation law will destroy the value of
incorporation2 66 and will devastate commercial relationships.267
It would not serve justice to "sweep aside longstanding principles" of
limited liability. 268 Nothing in CERCLA suggests that Congress wanted to
override common law corporate principles.26 Congress must act against the
backdrop of the complete corpus juris of the states. 270 Therefore, a matter
interpreted in a federal statute that is not addressed specifically must be left
to disposition via state law. 27' Because parent corporation liability is not
discussed in CERCLA, it follows that state law should be used in deciding
when and to what extent a parent can be held liable for the acts of its
subsidiary.272

The term "corporation" does not include its shareholders.27 3 Allowing
the courts to create an entire body of federal law from "whole cloth" will
necessarily destroy state sovereignty.274 Respondent believes that creating
this federal standard would constitute declaring "open season" on all parent
corporations for the illegal acts of their subsidiaries.275 There must be
significant conflict between the federal goals and the state law in order to
abrogate the state law.276 Moreover, in the arena of corporate law, there is a
strong presumption that state law must be applied to resolve parent
corporation liability.277
The need for national uniformity is not a strong enough need to displace
state corporation law. 278 There is a heavy burden on courts to use state and

264. Respondent's Brief at i, Bestfoods (No. 97-454).
265. See Amicus Brief of the Washington Legal Foundation in Support of Respondents
at 2, Bestfoods (No. 97-454).
266. Id. at 19.
267. Amicus Brief of United States Business and Industrial Council in Support of
Respondents at 23, Bestfoods (No. 97-454).
268. Respondent's Brief at i, Bestfoods (No. 97-454).

269.
270.
271.
272.

Id. at 29.
Id. at 28.
Id.
See id.

273. Respondent's Brief at 20, Bestfoods (No. 97-454).

274. Id. at 12.
275. Id. at 14.
276. Amicus Brief of the Washington Legal Foundation in Support of Respondents at
4-5, Bestfoods (No. 97-454).

277. Id. at 5.
278. Id. at 7.
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not federal law when applying a federal statute.27 9 It must be shown that
national uniformity is required, the state law would frustrate the federal
policy, and commercial relationships would not suffer in order to supplant
the state law. 2'0
State veil-piercing law does not undermine CERCLA's purpose of
holding liable any potentially responsible parties. 2 1 Using state law
provides the proper balance between CERCLA's imposition of costs and
protecting the corporate form.22 If the parent has a sham subsidiary, the
courts may still attack the parent, but corporate limited liability is held
inviolate.
States are interested in protecting their citizens from
environmental contamination and will adjust their veil-piercing standards
accordingly in order to snare the widest net of potentially liable parent
corporations. 2 4
In arguendo, the different states have somewhat uniform veil-piercing
laws. Basic uniformity can be accomplished by allowing the states to
maintain their sovereignty.2 s Veil-piercing in most states requires, with
some variation, two basic elements: 1) uniformity in interest so that the
separate corporate personalities no longer exist; and 2) fraud or wrongdoing
in use of the corporate form. In addition, the only reason that the petitioner
wants to apply federal veil-piercing law is because fraud is not a necessary
element under federal law.
In Michigan, fraud is a necessary element to
pierce the veil, and the respondent in this case is not guilty of any fraud.287
When Congress intends that there be a control test designed to find
liable parties included in a statute, they simply put it in the text of the
statute. s Congress put a control test in the Securities and Exchange Act
because it intended to do so in that case. 289 A parent can only be held liable
as an operator if they mechanically operate the site where the pollution has

279. See Anicus Brief of United States Business and Industrial Council in Support of
Respondents at 18, Bestfoods (No. 97-454).

280. Id. at 18-19.
281. Amicus Brief of the Washington Legal Foundation in Support of Respondents at
16, Bestfoods (No. 97-454).

282. Id. at 14.
283. See Amicus Brief of United States Business and Industrial Council in Support of
Respondents at 4, Bestfoods (No. 97-454).

284. Id. at 22.
285. Anilcus Brief of the Washington Legal Foundation in Support of Respondents at
9, Bestfoods (No. 97-454).

286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Respondent's Brief at 24, Bestfoods (No. 97-454).

289. 15 U.S.C. § 78t (a)(1994).
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taken place.29° It would be improper to lower the threshold of vicarious
liability by suggesting that control over the subsidiary's business operations
indicated liability for an entity separate from the subsidiary.29 ' Actual
control over the subsidiary is irrelevant, only operation of the facility in
question is relevant, and CPC did not mechanically operate the facility.
The Supreme Court must not review evidence for credibility or discuss
specific facts.293 The factual findings of the lower courts must be honored,
294

and the District Courts did not find that CPC was an operator of The Site.
CPC did place some of its employees at the site, but that is indicative of
normal stockholder oversight. 9 Ott II made its own decisions, 296
derived its
own revenues, and there was no abnormal intervention from CPC.
This argument is a textbook corporate America argument. It essentially
states that the courts must protect the profit-making enterprises of the nation
at the expense of the environment. Unfortunately for the environment, the
argument makes perfect legal sense. So, while one might want to disagree
with the points contained therein from an environmental and emotional
standpoint, he or she must submit that corporations and shareholders do have
certain rights, as do states.
C.

The Supreme Court Opinion

Justice Souter did not pull any punches when he wrote for an
unanimous court in United States v. Bestfoods. He boldly stated that a
parent corporation would not be held liable for violations under CERCLA if
it exercised control over its subsidiary's operations.2 97 However, the
resolution of this case did establish two ways in which a parent corporation
can be held liable for the acts of its subsidiary under CERCLA.29 8 A parent
corporation will be attached under CERCLA only when the corporate veil
can be pierced and when the parent actually participated in the operations of
the facility where the release of hazardous substances was made.2 9
The basic American tenet that a parent corporation will not be held
liable for acts perpetrated by its subsidiaries guided the Court through its

290. Respondent's Brief at 19, Bestfoods (No. 97-454).

291. See id. at 7.
292. Id.
293. Respondent's Supplemental Brief at 1-2, Bestfoods (No. 97-454).

294. Id. at 2.
295. Respondent's Brief at 5, BesOfoods (No. 97-454).

296. Id.
297. United States v. Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. 1876, 1881 (1998).
298. Id. at 1886 n.12.

299. Id. at 1881.
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reasoning. 300 The control that is incidental to stock ownership cannot make a
parent liable for a subsidiary's acts beyond the assets of the subsidiary.0 1
The Court held that the control incidental to stock ownership includes the
formation of corporate guidelines, the appointment of officers, and all other
acts normal to the parent-subsidiary relationship. 302 Even the subsidiary
having the identical board of directors as the parent is normal to the
shareholder relationship. 303 "[T]he congressional silence is audible" in
CERCLA.304 Nothing in the act rejects the long-standing principal that
parent corporations are protected by limited liability.30 5
However, the Court does note that it is equally fundamental to
American law that when a shareholder misuses the corporate form, the
corporate veil may be pierced, and the shareholder will therefore be subject
to liability. 30 CERCLA does not reject this principal of corporate law just
as it does not reject the principal of limited liability. 30 7 "[I]n order to
abrogate a common law principle, the statute must speak directly to the
question addressed by common law."308 For a matter as fundamental as
parent corporation liability to be omitted from a comprehensive statute like
CERCLA means that it was left out for a reason.2 The Court, therefore,
agreed with the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals that a parent corporation may
be held derivatively liable for the acts of its subsidiary under CERCLA when
and only when the corporate veil may be pierced under state law.31 0
The Court continued by stating that there is a significant difference
between liability as an owner versus liability as an operator, since CERCLA
provides for both.311 Piercing the corporate veil applies to liability for an
owner, but there may be a case where the parent corporation is an operator as
defined by the Act. 3 12 A parent may be liable for its own acts as the operator
of the facility which is owned by its subsidiary if the CERCLA violation can
be traced to the parent and the parent directly participated in the violation.3 13
300. See id. at 1884.
301. Id.
302. Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. at 1884.

303. See id.
304. Id. at 1885.
305. Id.

306. Id.
307. Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. at 1885.

308. Id. (internal quotations omitted) (quoting United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529,
534 (1993)).

309.
310.
311.
312.
313.

Id.
Id. at 1885-86.
Id. at 1889.
Bestfoods, 118 S.Ct. at 1886.
Id. at 1886.
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Therefore, while indirect liability may be limited to cases where the
corporate veil may be pierced, CERCLA's operator proviso deals with one's
direct liability for his or her own actions.3 14 A direct owner of a facility, a
subcontractor, a malicious saboteur, a business partner, and even a parent
corporation can be held liable.315 In the case of operator status, state
corporate law and the distinction between parent and subsidiary is irrelevant.
The critical inquiry is whether the parent operated the facility in question.1 6
It follows that a parent whose veil cannot be pierced because it adhered to
the traditional separation between parent and subsidiary may be held liable
as operator if it intervenes on one occasion relating to the release of
hazardous materials.1 7
In defining what it means to operate a facility, the court employed
dictionary definitions, plain meanings, and common sense.318 CERCLA
meant something more than mere mechanical activation of pumps and valves
when it used the word "operate" to describe those who are liable under the
statute.319 The Court ruled that the meaning of "to operate" should be
construed in the "organizational sense" that was intended by CERCLA.3 z To
,,321
operate means "to conduct the affairs of; to manage: operate a business.
Justice Souter then extended the meaning of "to operate" under CERCLA to
mean directing, managing, or performing tasks directly related to the
disposal of hazardous materials. This sharpened definition as applied to
CERCLA also included institutional decisionmaking regarding "compliance
with environmental regulations.3 22 The Court of Appeals, therefore,
correctly rejected the District Court's view of an actual control theory based
direct liability.
The Court rejected the actual control test for two reasons. First, the test
inappropriately combined indirect and direct liability; second, it did not look
at the parent relationship with the facility in question, but only at the
parent's relationship with its subsidiary. 3
The District Court only
considered CPC's one hundred percent ownership interest and the fact that it
placed its own employees on Ott H's board of directors; thus, the court did

314. Id.
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct at 1886-87 n.12.
318. See id. at 1887.
319. Id. at 1889.
320. Id. at 1887.

321.
322.
323.
324.

Id.
Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. at 1887.

Id.
Id.
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not adequately analyze CPC's liability. 325 The Court then directed the
District Court to consider the relationship between The Site and CPC on
remand.3 6
327
Guidance was given as to what constitutes operation of the facility.
Again, a sole stockholder in a corporation has the right to supervise the
subsidiary's finances, proscribe mandatory policies that the subsidiary must
follow, and monitor the subsidiary's performance without liability attaching
because of such actions.32 The main question is: "in degree and detail, [are
the] actions directed to the facility by... the parent... eccentric
under
' 329
accepted norms of parental oversight of a subsidiary's facility[?]
It is completely normal for a parent corporation to place its own officers
on the board of directors of a subsidiary, and that fact alone may not
establish parent corporation liability for the illegal acts of its subsidiary.330
Common or dual officers can and do "change hats" when representing either
the parent or the subsidiary, and the courts presume that they put on their
subsidiary hats when they work for the subsidiary. 331 However, when it
appears that an officer is acting in a manner that is congruent only with the
interest of the parent while also deviating
33 from well-established corporate
norms, the presumption may be rebutted. F
In conclusion, the Court stated that CERCLA does not fundamentally
alter or displace common law rules of limited liability. 333 If the actual
control test were used as the standard, derivative liability through veilpiercing would be unnecessary. 334
CERCLA-specific corporate law
doctrines are impermissible because 335they cast aside all traditional
expectations of liability under CERCLA.
The Court found adequate information contained in the record to
support a belief that CPC did in fact operate The Site as defined by
Bestfoods.335 It therefore vacated the judgement of the Court of Appeals and
remanded 337
the case to the District Court to reconsider the issue in light of
Bestfood.
325. See id. at 1887-88.
326. Id. at 1888.
327. Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. at 1889.

328.
329.
330.
331.
332.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1888.
Id.
Bestfoods, 118 S.Ct. at 1889 n.13.

333. Id. at 1889.

334.
335.
336.
337.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1890.
Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. at 1890.
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D. BriefAnalysis of the Supreme CourtDecision
The two forms of finding liability announced in Bestfoods33s allow the
EPA and private CERCLA plaintiffs to know when they will be able to force
a parent corporation to contribute to a cleanup effort. The Court pronounced
bright line rules which, if violated, indicate corporate parent liability. 339 The
guessing of the past is now over. However, there probably are many
corporate parent boards of directors that alter their policies with regard to
their subsidiaries in order to escape liability under the Bestfoods ruling but
continue managing their subsidiaries as they see fit. If making profits at the
expense of the environment is their corporate goal, it is assured that they will
find a way to do it without violating the lines drawn in Bestfoods.
CERCLA's intent is clear: it is a comprehensive statute designed to
attach liability onto every potentially responsible party. 340 It is inconceivable
that Congress intended that parent corporations could escape liability based
on fictional protections provided by the corporate form. The Bestfoods
ruling allows parent corporations, which may have been deeply involved in
the polluting activities of their subsidiaries, to escape liability. 34 ' The Court
should have looked more deeply into the policy concerns that underlie
CERCLA. If it had, it would have seen that the statute is sPjecifically
designed to prevent exactly what the Court allowed to happen. Common
law defenses are precluded when assessing CERCLA liability; only the
defenses set forth in the text of the statute are effective.4 3 By limiting parent
liability to situations where the parent operated the facility in question, the
Court effectively demonstrated to potential polluting parents how to
indirectly require that their subsidiaries pollute but get away with it in the
process. A parent, for example, could place profit requirements on a
subsidiary attainable only if it illegally dumped hazardous waste.
The Court of Appeals noted that the courts should not interpret
CERCLA in such a way that frustrates its purpose.345 However, the Supreme
Court's decision to allow state law to determine
whether
the corporate veil
,
346
should be pierced does frustrate CERCLA' s purpose.
Unlike federal law,
most state veil-piercing laws include an element of fraud that must be proven
338. Id. at 1886 n.12.

339. Id. at 1876.
340. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1994 & Supp. 1996).
341. See Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. at 1889.

342. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1994).
343. Id. § 9607(b)(3) (1994).
344. Besifoods, 118 S. Ct. at 1887.
345. United States v. Cordova Chem. Co. of Mich., 113 F.3d 572, 577 (6th Cir. 1997),
rev'd sub nom United States v. Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. 1876 (1998).
346. Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. at 1885-86.
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in order to pierce the veil.347 Under the Court's reasoning, a parent that has
interfered with a subsidiary to the point where the corporate veil should be
pierced, and has indirectly forced the subsidiary to pollute, but has not
engaged in any deception or fraud will nevertheless be protected by the
corporate form.34' The use of state law to pierce the corporate veil under
CERCLA frustrates the Act's purpose because federal veil-piercing law
would necessarily provide for more parents' indirect liability under
CERCLA. The purpose of CERCLA is to cleanup the environment by
forcing responsible parties to pay for the cleanup. 349
A state legislature or court system is now in the position to tailor its
veil-piercing law with the intent to attract corporations that are interested in
producing goods and not cleaning up the environmental pollutants they
release. States could easily make the test for piercing the corporate veil
narrower than it currently is in order to attract the worst element of rich,
polluting companies. In terms of whether state or federal law applies in veilpiercing cases, "the congressional silence is audible." 350 Some recent cases
that struggled to interpret Bestfoods have held that state law governs in veilpiercing inquiries. 5 1 Several courts have resolved the issue by relying on the
Sixth Circuit's decision in Donahey
33v. Bogle,3 which requires application
However, there is a strong possibility
of state law in veil-piercing cases.
that federal law may be held applicable in other jurisdictions. This issue
requires a legislative solution.
In Bestfoods, the Supreme Court promoted form over function. While
there now exist strict, uniform bounds by which a parent corporation may be
held liable for the acts of its subsidiary under CERCLA, 5 4 if a parent
corporation maintains a few formalities with regard to the corporate form, it
is nevertheless immune from liability should the subsidiary be charged with
a CERCLA violation. It is true that parent corporations now have more to
fear than ever. Before Bestfoods, the law regarding parent corporation
liability was confused and erratic at best.355 Nevertheless, the circumstances
by which a parent corporation will be held liable for the CERCLA violations
347. Amicus Brief of the Washington Legal Foundation in Support of Respondents at
9, Besffoods (No. 97-454).

348. See Bestroods, 118 S.Ct. at 1889.
349. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994 & Supp. 1996).
350. United States v. Green, 33 F. Supp. 2d 203, 217 (W.D.N.Y. 1998) (citing United
States v. Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. 1876, 1885 (1998)).
351. E.g., Browning-Ferris Indus. Of Ill., Inc. v. Ter Maat, 13 F. Supp. 2d 756, 765

(N.D. 1Il. 1998).
352. 129 F.3d 838 (6th Cir. 1997).

353. Id. at 843.
354. Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. at 1886 n.12.
355. See supra note 33.
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of its subsidiary under Bestfoods are narrow, including only when the
corporate veil may be pierced under state law, and when the parent actively
manages or operates the polluting facility.356 Shareholders and parent
corporations know how to protect themselves because of the Besifoods
decision. 3
VII. CONCLUSION
The environmental problem, which the Supreme Court tried to resolve
in Bestfoods, is not merely legal in nature. It permeates deeply rooted social
policies underlying CERCLA and the principle of limited liability.35 8 From
the first Superfund site, a coal tar sludge waste depository, 359 to present-day
environmental catastrophes, all modem levels of economic activity have
some effect on the environment. People prefer to "struggle along on [the]
asphalt and concrete, in imitation of the short-lived transportation machines
for which those hard surfaces were designed.,, 360 The use of agricultural
chemicals has increased to over one billion tons per year since 1962, up
nearly four hundred percent. 361 Humankind has developed a mind that
separates it from the natural world. 362 To complicate matters, CERCLA, a
statute designed to save the environment, is so confusing
that courts stumble
363
over its language and struggle to interpret it correctly.
Bestfoods sheds light on the confusing area of CERCLA parent
corporation liability. 3M4 One open issue is that of the safe limits for a parent
in its oversight, advisory, and standard-setting role with its subsidiary.365
Perhaps intentionally, Bestfoods did not draw a clear line on that issue.
Already, a case has cited to Bestfoods questioning its ruling.36 6 In the future,

356. Besifoods, 118 S.Ct. at 1881.
357. George J.Weiner & Lara Bernstein Mathews,Parent Corporationand Individual
Liability under CERCLA after Bestfoods, 13 NATURAL RESOURCES & ENVIRONMENT 456, 461
(1999).
358. See Aronovsky, supra note 6,at 461.
359. Pennsylvania v.Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1,6 (1989).
360. HOFF, supra note 9,at 93 (emphasis added).
361. Gore, supra note 8,at xix.
362. HoFF, supra note 9,at 77.
363. See United States v.Cordova Chem.Co. of Mich., 67 F.3d 586 (6th Cir. 1995)
(rehearing en bank granted on CERCLA action), rev'd sub nom United States v.Bestfoods,
118 S.Ct. 1876 (1998).

364. Kass, supra note 2,at 3.

365. Id.
366. United States v.Vitek Supply Corp., 151 F.3d 580 (1998).
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new court decisions, corporate practices, and new CERCLA clarifications
may resolve these still unresolved issues.367
Proponents of limited liability would argue that the theory of limited
liability through corporate ownership has proven to be beneficial to the
United States because the corporate structure insulates 68 Besfoods
demonstrates that the idea of limited liability is alive and well in terms of
Direct parent corporation liability would discourage
CERCLA.369
investment across the board.370 Limited liability encourages growth because
it allows investors to minimize their risks. 7 The purchaser of one share of a
corporation is not forced to place her entire wealth at risk. 372 Finally,
supporters of limited liability73 argue that it allows capital to flow to socially
desirable but risky ventures.
However, these arguments do not hold water in the environmental
context. Limited liability has protected wealthy industrialists since the late
1830s.374 It allows a parent corporation to avoid bearing the full social and
The parent corporation is free to reap the
economic costs of its actions.
full benefit of the subsidiary's production at the expense of the community
which supports it without bearing the true cost of its activities. 6 Limited
liability, therefore, merely provides an incentive to use a subsidiary as a
then shift the costs of environmental cleanup to
shield. The parent can 377
Involuntary contributors are residents of the
involuntary contributors.
community, recreational users of natural resources, and the government.3 78 It
is simply unconscionable to allow parent corporations to get rich while
taxpayers and residents bear the environmental costs for the corporation's
activities:
Economic analysis favors holding parent corporations of
responsible parties liable for the outstanding portion of any
judgement for hazardous waste clean-up costs and natural resource
367. Kass, supra note 2, at 3.
368. Amicus Brief of United States Business and Industrial .Council in Support of
Respondents at 23, Besifoods (No. 97-454).
369. United States v. Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. 1876, 1885 (1998).
370. Amicus Brief of United States Business and Industrial Council in Support of
Respondents at 14, Bestfoods (No. 97-454).
371. HarvardLiability, supra note 5, at 988.

372. Id. at 989.

373. Id.
374. Aronovsky, supra note 6, at 429-30.
375. HarvardLiability,supra note 5, at 990.
376. Id.
377. Id. at 991.
378. Id. at 992.
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damages. Application of this liability rule would internalize the
risks of setting up subsidiary corporations to perform hazardous
waste disposal activities. Therefore, corporations would have
strong incentives to exercise care when delegating and overseeing
hazardous waste disposal activities. In addition, application of the
rule would reduce the exposure of involuntary creditors to the risk
of releases of hazardous waste-a risk that they are ill-suited to
avoid or bear. Finally, the rule would reduce the enforcement costs
of cleaning up unsafe hazardous
waste disposal facilities and
37 9
restoring natural resources.
In the future, the courts should use the social, economic, democratic,
and policy factors underlying CERCLA to decide when limited liability
should not apply. 380 Liability for environmental harms should be placed
squarely on the shoulders of those who are in the best position to mitigate
damages and bear the costs. 3 s 1 Parent corporations are in this position
because they already have the oversight hierarchy in place and they can exert
strong influence over polluting subsidiaries.382 Parent corporations should
not incur liability when they unwittingly play some part in the subsidiary's
waste disposal activities,38 3 but in the interests of economic efficiency, they
should bear the costs of environmentally dangerous activities about which
they knew or should have known.
Mother Nature is the last constant in this ever shrinking world. If
CERCLA is to be the instrument of her savior, it must flourish, punishing all
those who would attempt to poison and destroy her bounty. Economics,
democracy, and recreation-these beliefs and activities exist because life
exists, and without a life-supporting ecosystem, free from chemical
pollutants, they will cease to exist.
ChristianA. Guzzano

379.
380.
381.
382.
383.

Id. at 998 (internal citations omitted).
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